McClellan, aftermath of the Battle of Antietam

During his time as the commander of the Army of the Potomac, George McClellan fought battles in Delaware and Virginia against General Lee’s Army. These battles include the extremely bloody battle fought between Antietam Creek and Sharpsburg, Maryland. After that battle, General McClellan refrained to further pursue or destroy Lee’s damaged army. His decisions for the Army of the Potomac, during September and October didn’t please his superiors. Eventually President Abraham Lincoln, General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, and other superiors became dissatisfied with General McClellan ability to command the Army of the Potomac. On the November 7th, 1862 General McClellan was replaced by General Burnside as commander of the Army of the Potomac.

In his reports General McClellan often complains of the conditions of his army and the need for reinforcements or supplies. In a letter to General Halleck, written on the 27th of September, McClellan explains of the position his men are in. He believes his men aren’t in any shape to fight:

“This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign nor to bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy or pressing military exigencies render it necessary. We are greatly deficient in officers. Many of the old regiments are reduced to mere skeletons. The new regiments need instruction…” (http://aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=19)

In this letter, written on the 15th of October, McClellan complains of the lack of clothing his men have yet to receive:

“I am compelled again to call your attention to the great deficiency of shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing that still exists in some of the corps in this army. Upon the assurances of the chief quartermaster, who based his calculation upon information received from Washington, that clothing would be forwarded at certain times, corps commanders sent their wagons to Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry for it. It did not arrive as promised, and has-not yet arrived…” (http://aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=19)

Provided in a report by General Halleck, in a letter to McClellan, written in October 13, 1962, President Lincoln expresses his frustrations with McClellan.

“As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do, without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpeper Court-House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored.” (http://www.civilwarhome.com/halleckantietamor.htm)


In this paragraph the President reminds McClellan of the telegraph he sent to Halleck requesting for the railroad from Harper’s Ferry to Winchester be in working order for the Army of the Potomac to “subsist” at Winchester. He further states that Lee and his army currently “subsist” at Winchester despite being in worse conditions. It would infuriate McClellan’s superiors while he asks for helping his poor army his enemy is taking their objectives with a poorer army. Lee was twice as far from Winchester than McClellan was, yet he was able to capture it faster with just horse-drawn wagons.

“Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to "operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours You dread his going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.” (http://www.civilwarhome.com/halleckantietamor.htm)

Lincoln lectures McClellan in what he considers one of the traditional sayings of war, when it comes to communications. To the president it appears as if McClellan doesn’t understand or won’t follow it. He provides examples to McClellan for what actions to take if Lee does in some way give up his communications.

“Exclusive of the water-line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his.” (http://www.civilwarhome.com/halleckantietamor.htm)

The President condemns McClellan for not taking Richmond at a good opportunity. McClellan is closer to the Confederate’s capital, Richmond, than Lee is. For McClellan the route is a “chord,” while Lee has to travel through the “arc of a circle.” Lincoln further criticizes McClellan more on his movements and tactics. He gives alternate actions to McClellan’s previous ones and advice on situations should McClellan run into them. At the end of the letter he states, “This letter is in no sense an order.” Rather than have McClellan strictly follow what he says Lincoln is showing his dissatisfaction and telling him how he should have used his Army.

In his reports, McClellan shows a quote from a letter by General Halleck to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton.
“The General-in-Chief, in a letter to the Secretary of War on the 28th of October, says:
In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army under General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy.” (http://aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=19)

In this quote Halleck complains that McClellan should be able to attack the Confederate forces without the supplies McClellan requests. In reply to such criticism, McClellan states the following:

“I dismiss this subject with the remark that I have found it impossible to resist the force of my own convictions, that the commander of an army who, from the time of its organization, has for eighteen months been in constant communication with its officers and men, the greater part of the time engaged in active service in the field, and who has exercised this command in many battles, must certainly be considered competent to determine whether his army is in proper condition to advance on the enemy or not, and he must necessarily possess greater facilities for forming a correct judgment in regard to the wants of his men and the condition of his supplies than the General-in-Chief in his office at Washington City.”

McClellan argues that since he is in the frontlines with greater communication with men and experience he is in a better position to judge whether his men are in the condition to fight the enemy than a man miles away in a city, sitting in his office.
An article from The New York Times, published on December 3, 1862, details the conflict between McClellan and his superiors:

“The report states that the army rested on the north bank of the Potomac, near Sharpsburgh, from the 17th of September until the 26th of October, and says that “the long inactivity of so large an army in the face of a defeated foe and during the most favorable season fro rapid marches and a vigorous campaign was a matter of great disappointment and regret.”

Gen. Halleck states that he telegraphed McClellan, Oct. 6, to cross the river. Gen. McClellan disapproved the plan of crossing south of the Blue Ridge, but proposed to cross at Harper’s Ferry, and move on Winchester, but did not cross until Oct. 26, and then at Berlin, the passage occupying till Nov. 3. During this period Gen. McClellan stopped communicating with the Commander-in-Chief, addressing the President. On the 5th his removal was ordered.” (http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9500E3DE143CE63ABC4B53DFB4678389679FDE)

The article shows that from after the Battle of Antietam to over one month later McClellan didn’t move against Lee. Lee’s army is described in a state as “defeated” and the conditions for a successful attack for McClellan “favorable.” McClellan is given an order by his superior to finally cross the Potomac River through a particular route. McClellan not only disagreed through which path to cross the Potomac but he also crossed it 20 days after the date given by his superiors. His delay in movements just makes his superiors more frustrated. What the article describes about McClellan doesn’t give the idea that he would be a general fit for eliminating the Confederate Army, anytime soon at least.

Dissatisfied with the results of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln relieved McClellan of his command and replaced him with Burnside, a commander of a corps in the Army of the Potomac. McClellan could have made better use of the army and crush Lee’s army while he had the chance, but he wasn’t the worst. General Burnside would lead the army to disaster at Fredericksburg and General Hooker at Chancellorsville. The President finally became satisfied with General Meade, who lasted as commander of the army until the end of the war.
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Sources:
McClellan, George to Halleck. 29 September-31 October 1862. M.Gen McClellan's Official Reports. Antietam on the Web: Official Records. Available from: http://aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=19

Anonymous. Antietam on the Web. Updated 21 November 2009; Cited 21 November 2009. http://aotw.org/index.php

Anonymous. “THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.; Extracts from Gen. Halleck's Report to the Secretary of War.” The New York Times. 3 December 1862. Accessed 21 November 2009. Available from: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9500E3DE143CE63ABC4B53DFB4678389679FDE

Halleck, Henry to Stanton. 3 September-14 October 1862. Operations in Northern Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania. Available from: http://www.civilwarhome.com/halleckantietamor.htm

More on the casualties of the Battle of Antietam

There are different articles, letters, and reports from individuals that give a different observation of bloody the Battle of Antietam was. The descriptions given are different from each other, but they contribute in showing how awful the United States greatest tragedy was. While the personal account of a Confederate soldier and a nurse who was the mother of a soldier was used, the sources for the second part of the blog will be from newspaper articles and the commanders of the battle.

A news article from the Harper’s Weekly, a magazine based in New York City, goes into detail how horrific the battle was:

“The severest fighting of the war was followed by the most appalling sights upon the battle-field. Never, I believe, was the ground strewn with the bodies of the dead and the dying in greater numbers or in more shocking attitudes. Let those who desire to witness a great battle, and gratify themselves with the sublimest spectacle which mortals ever gaze upon, hear but once the cries and groans of the wounded, and see the piles of dead men, in attitudes which show the writhing agony in which they died—faces distorted with the pains which afflicted the dead in their latest moments, begrimed and covered with clotted blood, arms and legs torn from the body or the body itself torn asunder, and all the scenes upon the field of battle which fill one with horror and sadness, and they will be content to deprive themselves in future of the sublimity of a battle scene, when they think upon the horrors of the field where the dead lie in heaps unburied, and the dying and wounded uncared for beside them. The faces of those who had fallen in the battle were, after more than a day's exposure, so black that no one would ever suspect that they had been white. All looked like negroes, and as they lay in piles where they had fallen, one upon another, they filled the by-standers with a sense of horror. In the road they lay scattered all around, and the stench which arose from the bodies decomposing in the sun was almost unendurable. Passing after night from Sharpsburg to Hagerstown upon the turnpike, it required the greatest care to keep my horse from trampling upon the dead, so thickly were they strewn around. Along the line for not more than a mile at least one thousand five hundred lay unburied.” (http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/civil-war/1862/october/antietam-battlefield.htm)

Although no numbers of casualties are given it still shows how deadly it was. The descriptions used by the writer of the article, makes it seem as if it was an anti-war piece of work. It’s surprising an article which wouldn’t do well for helping morale support or support in the war be published during a war. For example, “…and all the scenes upon the field of battle which fill one with horror and sadness, and they will be content to deprive themselves in future of the sublimity of a battle scene, when they think upon the horrors of the field…dying and wounded uncared for…” The great detail in the sights, sounds, and smell gives an unpleasant view of the aftermath of a battle, which can be easily imagined. “…Hear but once the cries and groans of the wounded, and see the piles of dead men… the stench which arose from the bodies decomposing in the sun was almost unendurable.” The where so many killed in the battlefield that the writer had “required the greatest care to keep my horse from trampling upon the dead, so thickly were they strewn around.”

Another article, from The Washington Star, gives an account on the casualties from the battle:

“It is impossible at this writing to form any correct idea of our loss or that of the enemy, but it is heavy on both sides. Ours will probably reach in killed and wounded 10,000. That of the enemy will not exceed it.
The enemy's dead, which nearly all fell into our hands, were thickly strewn over the fields, laying in heaps in many places.
Our wounded were immediately carried from the field, and the best possible attention given them.” (http://www.civilwarhome.com/washstarantietam.htm)

Unlike the first editorial this doesn’t give so much detail on the casualties. In the article it is admitted that “It is impossible at this writing to form any correct idea of our loss or that of the enemy.” But, any number given for the federal is about 10,000. It is simply given that the confederates have no more than there adversary. There is a difference in the caretaking of the wounded. The Harper’s Weekly states, “…dying and wounded uncared for…” In this article the wounded were “immediately carried from the field, and the best possible attention given them.”

For President Jefferson Davis of the CSA casualties were so appalling that it prevented him and General Robert Lee from wanting to continue the battle. Davis said, “…our loss had been so great, and there was so much disorganization in some of the commands, that I did not consider it proper to renew the attack that day.” (http://www.historycentral.com/CivilWar/Ant/Davis.html) No details are given by President Davis, but we know that casualties were so high that no more could be sustained. The Confederate Army had to retreat and regroup in order fight another battle.

The most accurate report on casualties from the participants of the battle would be from George McClellan, General of the Army of the Potomac: http://aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=19

His report shows the amount of officers and enlisted killed, wounded, and missing from a unit as small as a division. From the report it shows that over 10,000 of the 12,500 casualties were wounded or missing. For every officer or enlisted soldier killed 5 other soldiers were wounded or missing. What the report does not account for captured. Either there were no sightings of federal troops being captured or either it is assumed that several of the soldiers missing might have been captured. Unlike the article from the Harper’s Weekly, this report doesn’t uses gory descriptions but tables and numbers to show the actual number of victims.




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Sources:


World Correspondent. “Horrors of the Battlefield.” Harper’s Weekly. 11 October 1862.
Accessed 24 October 2009
Available from: http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/civil-war/1862/october/antietam-battlefield.htm

Anonymous. “The War in Maryland.” The Washington Star. 19 September 1862. Accessed 18 September 2009
Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0917.html#article

McClellan, George to Halleck. 29 September, 1862. M.Gen McClellan's Official Reports. Antietam on the Web: Official Records. Available from: http://aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=19

Anonymous. Antietam on the Web. Updated 20 Ocotber 2009; Cited 24 October 2009. http://aotw.org/index.php

Davis, Jefferson. Jefferson Davis's View of the Battle. History Central.com. Accessed 24 October 2009. Available from: http://www.historycentral.com/CivilWar/Ant/Davis.html

Antietam: Bloodiest Day for America

On September 17, 1862, between the town of Sharpsburg and the Antietam Creek, was an enormous engagement of Union and Confederate forces. The Battle of Antietam, also known as Battle of Sharpsburg, was fought between the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Robert E. Lee, and the Army of the Potomac, under General George B. McClellan. The day that battle was fought was the day of the United States greatest tragedy. It was the bloodiest day in American history. More Americans died in that single day than in any other day in the nation’s military history. More than attacks on September 11 2001, Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, or the invasion of Normandy in World War II.

One source that reported the casualties during while the war was on going is from The New York Times. According to an article on the battle it was, “impossible to accurately estimate the losses on either side.” However, it is written, “In the opinion of those best capable of judging, our (Union) loss will not exceed 10,000” (The New York Times). In the article it’s claimed that, “rebel officers” supposedly said their losses to be, “as high as 30,000 men.” Modern day sources give different numbers. One source gives a total of 22,700 killed, wounded, missing, and captured from both armies. In the newspaper article it also says, “The loss of the enemy was necessarily much larger than ours” (The New York Times). 2,100 Union troops were killed, the Confederates lost 1,550. The historian, Eric Foner, wrote that, “In a single day of fighting, over 4,300 men were killed and 18,000 wounded (2,000 of whom later died of their injuries).” He goes on to describe the horrible outcome saying, “…more American soldiers perished as Antietam than in all the other wars fought by the United States in the nineteenth century combined” (Foner p. 488).

Private Alexander Hunter Confederate unit suffered high casualties during the battle. In his personal account he mentions constantly seeing men under fire, wounded, dying, or already dead. He compares the conditions of the different units he belonged to before the battle with the conditions during the battle:

“Our brigade was a mere outline of its former strength, not a sixth remaining. Our regiment, the Seventeenth, that once carried into battle eight hundred muskets, now stood on the crest, ready to die in a forlorn hope, with but forty-six muskets. My company, that often used to march in a grand review in two platoons of fifty men each, carried into Sharpsburg but two muskets (the writer and one other)” (Hunter).

However, these aren’t the final number of troops remaining. After another clash with Union troops and having been captured his remaining unit of 46 men had suffered another loss of 35 casualties. While marching back to Union lines he saw so many dead troops that, “…the dead lay thick all around.”

Another person who gives a personal account of the horrors of the battle is through Isabella M. Fogg. In 1981, Fogg followed her son, a member of the 6^th Maine Regiment, to Washington, D.C. She volunteered to work for the Maine Camp and Hospital Association, an organization staffed by civilians but supported by Maine. She worked at the hospitals in Washington, but she eventually went on to aid the soldiers on the field. In a letter she gives an account of her work with the Camp and Hospital Association during the aftermath of the battle around Sharpsburg, the area where the battle took place. This report gives an insight into what appalling conditions sick and wounded and soldiers had to go through since the battle. Anyone who had experience what she went through would be horrified. This must be especially hard for Fogg who has a son fighting, and who might be going through a similar environment. Her descriptions show that the men were suffering from lack of food, shelter, clothing, and diseases. Those who cared for them were also suffering; from lack of supplies, volunteers for aid, and being exposed to outbreaks of illnesses.

In one hospital Fogg visits she describes the conditions as, “miserable…the men complain very much…the effluvia arising from the conditions of these grounds is intolerable, quite enough to make a man in perfect health sick, and how men can recover in such a place is a mystery to me.” She describes these conditions to every where she visits, some in more appalling settings, few in better circumstances. For example she says, “…visited the Russell Spring Hospital, found them comparatively comfortable with only three Maine men” (Fogg). However, right after that line she continues with, “Again we went to Smoketown, hoping to find them in a more comfortable condition than we were last there, but how sadly were we disappointed” (Fogg). In many cases the medics and civilian aids are overwhelmed with soldiers in need of help. In one visit she wrote, “We visited the sick of the 19^th in care of Dr. Hawes, asst. surgeon, he has upwards of 50, does all in his power for their comfort” (Fogg).

Probably the worst conditions Hogg saw had seen was at the Loudin Valley, where she wrote, “…the condition of several hundreds, who had been sent the day previous without preparation. We found them lying on the ground, in all directions…no surgeons, nurses, or cooks were on the ground and hard bread their only food” (Fogg). She also describes the outbreaks of diseases, “…he told us he was sick, thought he had the measles…we supposing it to be a case of small pox…The exposure has been such that diphtheria has broken out among them…nearly every case fatal. One of our poor Maine boys who had been very diligent in looking up for us those belonging to Maine, at our last visit had been seized suddenly with diphtheria… lived but two or three hours” (Fogg).

The soldiers in Sharpsburg even have to deal with a snow storm, many of them who are lacking clothing or any layer of warmth. “You could have seen the poor fellows huddled together…their rents connected by flyes, the same as erected in the heat of summer, many without walls and no stoves…And all I may say, almost without exception with thin muslin shirts on” (Fogg). The only joy she gave was when a box, “contained upwards of a hundred flannel shirts, with some other useful articles” (Fogg). was found to keep warm up the freezing troops.

Fogg best summarizes the situation in Sharpsburg when she wrote; “…there were plenty to take their names but few to relieve their wants” (Fogg). The Battle of Antietam was fought in a single day, yet men continued to suffer. With 4,300 dead and over 18,000 wounded, captured, and missing in a single day it was the single bloodiest and darkest day in The United States history.

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Sources:

Anonymous. “Battle of Antietam Creek.” The New York Times. 20 September 1862.

Accessed 18 September 2009

Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0917.html#article

Foner, Eric. Give Me Liberty! : An American History, Second Seagull Edition. New York.

W.W. Norton & Co. September 19, 2008

Alexander Hunter. A High Private's Account Of The Battle Of Sharpsburg. Updated 11 November 2006.

Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. X. Richmond, Va., Oct. And Nov., 1882. Nos 10-11

Available from: http://www.civilwarhome.com/highprivate1.htm

John M. Blow. Alexander Hunter Confederate States of America Army. Updated 17 May 2006; Cited 18, 2009

http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/alexander-hunter.htm

Fogg, Isabella M. to Hathaway. Nov. 10, 1862. Records of the Maine Soldier's Relief Agency in the Maine State Archives; and Self-Imposed Work of Mercy: Civil War Women of the Maine Camp and Hospital Association, 1861-1865. Maine

Available from: http://www.state.me.us/sos/arc/archives/military/civilwar/foggyarn.htm

Fogg, Isabella M. to Hathaway. Nov. 10, 1862. Records of the Maine Soldier's Relief Agency in the Maine State Archives; and Self-Imposed Work of Mercy: Civil War Women of the Maine Camp and Hospital Association, 1861-1865. Maine

Available from: http://aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=367

Anonymous. Antietam on the Web. Updated 15 September 2009; Cited 18 September 2009.

http://aotw.org/index.php