McClellan, aftermath of the Battle of Antietam

During his time as the commander of the Army of the Potomac, George McClellan fought battles in Delaware and Virginia against General Lee’s Army. These battles include the extremely bloody battle fought between Antietam Creek and Sharpsburg, Maryland. After that battle, General McClellan refrained to further pursue or destroy Lee’s damaged army. His decisions for the Army of the Potomac, during September and October didn’t please his superiors. Eventually President Abraham Lincoln, General-in-Chief Henry Halleck, and other superiors became dissatisfied with General McClellan ability to command the Army of the Potomac. On the November 7th, 1862 General McClellan was replaced by General Burnside as commander of the Army of the Potomac.

In his reports General McClellan often complains of the conditions of his army and the need for reinforcements or supplies. In a letter to General Halleck, written on the 27th of September, McClellan explains of the position his men are in. He believes his men aren’t in any shape to fight:

“This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign nor to bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy or pressing military exigencies render it necessary. We are greatly deficient in officers. Many of the old regiments are reduced to mere skeletons. The new regiments need instruction…” (http://aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=19)

In this letter, written on the 15th of October, McClellan complains of the lack of clothing his men have yet to receive:

“I am compelled again to call your attention to the great deficiency of shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing that still exists in some of the corps in this army. Upon the assurances of the chief quartermaster, who based his calculation upon information received from Washington, that clothing would be forwarded at certain times, corps commanders sent their wagons to Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry for it. It did not arrive as promised, and has-not yet arrived…” (http://aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=19)

Provided in a report by General Halleck, in a letter to McClellan, written in October 13, 1962, President Lincoln expresses his frustrations with McClellan.

“As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do, without the railroad last named. He now wagons from Culpeper Court-House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with wagons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored.” (http://www.civilwarhome.com/halleckantietamor.htm)


In this paragraph the President reminds McClellan of the telegraph he sent to Halleck requesting for the railroad from Harper’s Ferry to Winchester be in working order for the Army of the Potomac to “subsist” at Winchester. He further states that Lee and his army currently “subsist” at Winchester despite being in worse conditions. It would infuriate McClellan’s superiors while he asks for helping his poor army his enemy is taking their objectives with a poorer army. Lee was twice as far from Winchester than McClellan was, yet he was able to capture it faster with just horse-drawn wagons.

“Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to "operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours You dread his going into Pennsylvania, but if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him. If he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.” (http://www.civilwarhome.com/halleckantietamor.htm)

Lincoln lectures McClellan in what he considers one of the traditional sayings of war, when it comes to communications. To the president it appears as if McClellan doesn’t understand or won’t follow it. He provides examples to McClellan for what actions to take if Lee does in some way give up his communications.

“Exclusive of the water-line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his.” (http://www.civilwarhome.com/halleckantietamor.htm)

The President condemns McClellan for not taking Richmond at a good opportunity. McClellan is closer to the Confederate’s capital, Richmond, than Lee is. For McClellan the route is a “chord,” while Lee has to travel through the “arc of a circle.” Lincoln further criticizes McClellan more on his movements and tactics. He gives alternate actions to McClellan’s previous ones and advice on situations should McClellan run into them. At the end of the letter he states, “This letter is in no sense an order.” Rather than have McClellan strictly follow what he says Lincoln is showing his dissatisfaction and telling him how he should have used his Army.

In his reports, McClellan shows a quote from a letter by General Halleck to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton.
“The General-in-Chief, in a letter to the Secretary of War on the 28th of October, says:
In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army under General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy.” (http://aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=19)

In this quote Halleck complains that McClellan should be able to attack the Confederate forces without the supplies McClellan requests. In reply to such criticism, McClellan states the following:

“I dismiss this subject with the remark that I have found it impossible to resist the force of my own convictions, that the commander of an army who, from the time of its organization, has for eighteen months been in constant communication with its officers and men, the greater part of the time engaged in active service in the field, and who has exercised this command in many battles, must certainly be considered competent to determine whether his army is in proper condition to advance on the enemy or not, and he must necessarily possess greater facilities for forming a correct judgment in regard to the wants of his men and the condition of his supplies than the General-in-Chief in his office at Washington City.”

McClellan argues that since he is in the frontlines with greater communication with men and experience he is in a better position to judge whether his men are in the condition to fight the enemy than a man miles away in a city, sitting in his office.
An article from The New York Times, published on December 3, 1862, details the conflict between McClellan and his superiors:

“The report states that the army rested on the north bank of the Potomac, near Sharpsburgh, from the 17th of September until the 26th of October, and says that “the long inactivity of so large an army in the face of a defeated foe and during the most favorable season fro rapid marches and a vigorous campaign was a matter of great disappointment and regret.”

Gen. Halleck states that he telegraphed McClellan, Oct. 6, to cross the river. Gen. McClellan disapproved the plan of crossing south of the Blue Ridge, but proposed to cross at Harper’s Ferry, and move on Winchester, but did not cross until Oct. 26, and then at Berlin, the passage occupying till Nov. 3. During this period Gen. McClellan stopped communicating with the Commander-in-Chief, addressing the President. On the 5th his removal was ordered.” (http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9500E3DE143CE63ABC4B53DFB4678389679FDE)

The article shows that from after the Battle of Antietam to over one month later McClellan didn’t move against Lee. Lee’s army is described in a state as “defeated” and the conditions for a successful attack for McClellan “favorable.” McClellan is given an order by his superior to finally cross the Potomac River through a particular route. McClellan not only disagreed through which path to cross the Potomac but he also crossed it 20 days after the date given by his superiors. His delay in movements just makes his superiors more frustrated. What the article describes about McClellan doesn’t give the idea that he would be a general fit for eliminating the Confederate Army, anytime soon at least.

Dissatisfied with the results of the Army of the Potomac, Lincoln relieved McClellan of his command and replaced him with Burnside, a commander of a corps in the Army of the Potomac. McClellan could have made better use of the army and crush Lee’s army while he had the chance, but he wasn’t the worst. General Burnside would lead the army to disaster at Fredericksburg and General Hooker at Chancellorsville. The President finally became satisfied with General Meade, who lasted as commander of the army until the end of the war.
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Sources:
McClellan, George to Halleck. 29 September-31 October 1862. M.Gen McClellan's Official Reports. Antietam on the Web: Official Records. Available from: http://aotw.org/exhibit.php?exhibit_id=19

Anonymous. Antietam on the Web. Updated 21 November 2009; Cited 21 November 2009. http://aotw.org/index.php

Anonymous. “THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.; Extracts from Gen. Halleck's Report to the Secretary of War.” The New York Times. 3 December 1862. Accessed 21 November 2009. Available from: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9500E3DE143CE63ABC4B53DFB4678389679FDE

Halleck, Henry to Stanton. 3 September-14 October 1862. Operations in Northern Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania. Available from: http://www.civilwarhome.com/halleckantietamor.htm